Chennault’s Grand Experiment
Major General Claire Lee Chennault, in command of the 14th Air Force, proudly wears the "Flying Tiger" patch of the 14th Air Force on his A-2 flight jacket. Chennault's empathy for the Chinese people suffering under Japanese oppression led him to envision and implement his grand experiment: the Chinese-American Composite Wing.
The 14th Air Force (formerly the China Air Task Force) had been constituted on March 5, 1943, and activated on March 10 in Kunming, China. Claire Lee Chennault, former commander of the renowned American Volunteer Group that gained fame as the “Flying Tigers”, was promoted to Major General and appointed commander of the 14th Air Force, whose insignia featured a orange, winged Bengal tiger with a star above its back on an azure background. The insignia was adopted in October 1943 with Chennault's approval and endorsement. Members of the 14th Air Force and of the CATF that preceded it continued to be known as “Flying Tigers,” although they were not a part of his original AVG. Taken from a Chinese newspaper article, the term Fei Hu was used as a simile to praise the prowess of the American aircrews as they attacked and destroyed the Japanese killer airplanes and was not originally intended as a proper name applied to any specific unit, although that is how it came to be perceived by some. A "friendly rivalry" always existed between the original mercenary Flying Tigers and the Flying Tigers of the 14th Air Force as to who had "bragging rights" to the name.
Military forces in China at that time were divided into two hostile camps: the Nationalist army of the pro-Western Kuomintang government commanded by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, whose headquarters was in Chungking, and the Communist "Red" Army of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), based to the northeast in Shensi Province. A latent civil war between the Nationalists and Communists limited efforts to protect Chinese territory from foreign invasion. Although the two factions had agreed to fight the Japanese instead of each other, the ensuing alliance was at best a troubled truce, and attempts to coordinate their efforts against the invaders were markedly unsuccessful.
By this time, the Nationalist Chinese army―at war against Japan’s superior troops since 1937―constituted a numerically-depleted, poorly-equipped, inadequately-trained, and ineptly-led fighting force. Its equally-deficient air force, in which pilot’s wings were awarded based upon political or familial connections rather than ability to fly, was incapable of providing adequate support to the troops opposing the occupying forces on the ground in “the Second Sino-Japanese War,” as it was called in China.
To rehabilitate the Chinese Air Force fighting under Generalissimo Chiang, head of the Republic of China, and to provide good will and understanding between the Chinese and Americans for the future, Chennault proposed that an Operational Training Unit be established in India and operated by the 14th Air Force for the purpose of training Chinese fighter and bomber crews for combat operations. In addition, he suggested that ROCAF mechanics, under AAF supervision, assemble the aircraft to be used, and that Chinese combat and maintenance crews train at the OTU with the units to which they were to be assigned. On completion of the training of a complement, the American and Chinese officers who had acted as instructors would then serve as group, squadron, and flight commanders of the combat unit.
The plan was approved, and the assembling of personnel and equipment began. Under the direction of the Chinese-American Operational Training Unit (Provisional), the 1st Bombardment Group (Provisional) and 3rd Fighter Group (Provisional) were activated on July 31, 1943. Malir Airdrome, on the outskirts of Karachi (then in India, now Pakistan), was chosen as the location for the OTU because planes and gasoline were more readily available there than in China. The city's location on the coast of the Arabian Sea, with its two large ports, allowed the Allies to ship equipment, supplies, and troops for use in the CBI.
Old-model P-40s and B-25s no longer of service for tactical deployment were brought in for use as trainers. Additional B-25s from the United States and P-40s from North Africa were later assigned. In early July, Chennault reported that Chinese and American personnel were arriving at Karachi and that the OTU was expected to be ready on August 5. According to the proposed schedule, the OTU would turn out eight fighter squadrons and four medium and light bombardment squadrons, together with three group and one wing headquarters, by March 15, 1944. The training program began as scheduled and was well under way by September 1.
The Chinese-American Composite Wing (Provisional), organized under code name "Lotus,” was formally activated at Malir on October 1, 1943. It was “composite” in that its aircraft comprised both fighters and bombers. Although designated as a wing, it never flew as a single unit; instead, its operational units were often billeted at bases located hundreds of miles apart across India and China. Originally commanded by Col. Winslow C. Morse, the CACW eventually consisted of the 1st Bombardment Group equipped with B-25 Mitchells (two-engine medium bombers) and the 3rd and 5th Fighter Groups equipped with P-40s, many of them painted with the iconic "shark mouth" of the original Flying Tigers. Although most often called "Warhawks,” the toothy grin of these P-40 pursuit planes earned them the preferred name of "Sharks" in the CACW.
Each group was made up of four squadrons each: the 1st Bomb Group of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Bomb Squadrons; the 3rd Fighter Group of the 7th, 8th, 28th, and 32nd Fighter Squadrons; and the 5th Fighter Group of the 17th, 26th, 27th, and 29th Fighter Squadrons. These were Republic of China Air Force squadrons that had been assigned to the CACW and reorganized according to American military standards. Duplicate Chinese and American commands were established for both bomber and fighter groups. Col. John A. Hilger, second in command on Jimmy Doolittle's famous raid in April 1942, was chosen as the 1st Bomb Group's American commander, while Maj. Lee Hsueh-yen (also in records as Hsueh-yian) became the Chinese co-commander. Because he had been shot down in the Tokyo raid and the 14th Air Force had a policy that prohibited airmen from flying combat missions after they had returned through enemy territory, Hilger was replaced by Lt. Col. Irving L. ("Twig") Branch on September 21, 1943.
The CACW's planes and other equipment were supplied through Lend-Lease. Authorized through an Act of Congress and signed into law on March 11, 1941, the program supplied materiel and services to America's Allies. Between its inception and the end of the war in September 1945, $50.1 billion worth of supplies were shipped to various theaters of operation around the world, and the Republic of China eventually became the recipient of $1.6 billion worth of these supplies and services.
Chinese pilots, bombardiers, and navigators were trained in the United States before being returned for service in the CACW which, although officially part of the Chinese Air Force, was administratively assigned to the 14th Air Force. These airmen, many who had been recruited as students at Chinese universities, were "the cream" and took great pride in being chosen for this elite organization. The Wing's operational units, fighter and bombardment, were jointly commanded by both American and Chinese Air Force officers, and its aircraft were jointly manned by American and Chinese pilots and aircrewmen. Because the Wing's aircraft were owned by the Chinese, its aircraft bore the Chinese Nationalist emblem, the blue and white twelve-pointed Kuomintang sun.
A binational unit such as this had never been attempted before. An Air Force press release found among CACW records explained the concept. “In the composite wing, Americans will not fight as units for the Chinese air force as the AVG did, but actually fly side by side with the Chinese.” It explained that some planes would have American pilots with Chinese crews, but most would be flown by all-Chinese crews. “Occasionally, an American will be in the lead element, at other times in the wing elements, the idea being to give the Chinese squadron and group leaders the latest ‘know-how’ in tactics with American aircraft and to give them training in actual combat under the best American direction.”
Lt. Col. T. Alan Bennett, in command of the 3rd Fighter Group ("Al's Assassins"), praised the Chinese airmen, stating, "You couldn't find a finer bunch of fliers anywhere. We think those guys are so good we're staking our lives on it. Personally, I'll go anywhere with them.” He went on to explain, "This is, after all, in the nature of a great experiment, and it must not fail and we know it won't fail as far as the human element is concerned.” The intention was to eventually turn the unit over to the Chinese after they had become sufficiently experienced to operate without the Americans, but this goal had not been attained by the end of the war.
Chennault's plan was for one bombardment squadron to be trained simultaneously with two fighter squadrons over a period of six weeks, with the Americans acting as mentors to the Chinese. When those three squadrons had completed their training, they would be sent to China as three additional squadrons began training. This would be continued until a bombardment group of four squadrons and two fighter groups with four squadrons each had been brought to combat readiness. Group after group of Chinese and American pilots and crews came into Malir from China and America. These men spent hundreds of hours flying B-25s and P-40s and in studying military tactics, motors, and equipment. American GIs in khaki fatigues worked side by side in a cordial atmosphere with the Chinese, clad in their dark blue work suits.
This hitherto untried experiment of coordinating the efforts of two widely-dissimilar national groups was not without challenges. Differing languages presented the most obvious and immediate difficulty, but complete disparities in ideology, philosophy, and culture also had to be addressed. “The blunt American manners clashed sharply with the Chinese ideas on face saving and both Chinese and Americans found they had to modify their manners in order to get good results. Many Chinese pilots had to be persuaded that it was not cowardly to bail out of a badly damaged plane and that crashing with their plane served no purpose,” according to a CACW report written early in the venture. Maj. Don Hummel, formerly an attorney in Tucson and now Wing intelligence officer as well as historical officer, explained: “We mess around a bit in the wide chasm between two languages and two civilizations, but on the whole we get along beautifully and are saved by a sense of humor on both sides for our mutual blunderings.” He blamed the contrast between the Americans’ drive and need for immediate results with the Chinese tradition of patience and “politeness” for the misunderstandings that did occasionally arise. Although both nationalities made efforts to accommodate their counterparts in the interest of achieving a common goal, some problems remained unresolved at the end of the war.
Read more about this only-one-of-its-kind organization in The Spray and Pray Squadron: 3rd Bomb Squadron, 1st Bomb Group, Chinese-American Composite Wing in World War II.