“Moonless-Night Missions”
1Lt. Leo C. Baker, 3rd Bomb Squadron pilot (left), and 2Lt. Salvatore A. Lipira, 4th Bomb Squadron navigator (right), stand in front of their barracks at Chihkiang. Both took part in Task Force 34”s early missions, many of them “moonless-night missions." So dangerous was this kind of flying that Lipira and an entire B-25 crew died when they hit the side of a mountain soon after takeoff on May 19, 1945. Alfred A. Magyar collection, courtesy of Lynn Magyar Zwigard.
While 3rd Bomb Squadron Mitchells remained grounded at Peishiyi (now Baishiyi) in late 1944, it became clear to observers that Japanese forces coming from the north were moving toward a junction with troops advancing westward toward Nanning from Canton. As the enemy's attempt to drive Allied forces from bases across China moved forward, even Kunming, headquarters of the 14th Air Force, came under threat. Although this vital military complex was never taken, airfields fell like dominoes over the next few months. Chinese ground forces, with the support of Maj. Gen. Claire Lee Chennault's 14th Air Force, opposed the enemy's relentless advance in Central China, especially the regions south of the Yellow River and immediately west of the Peiping-Hankow (“Ping-Han”) Railway, and as far east as the Nanking-Shanghai area.
Col. John A. Dunning, in command of the 5th Fighter Group at Chihkiang (Zhijiang), had put in a request in October for four B-25s with crews to run missions in close conjunction with his "Flying Hatchet" fighters to resist the Japanese drive. His pilots had found that daytime targets were scarce and scattered because the enemy was moving troops and supplies primarily at night, so that was when he intended to strike. Called "Task Force 34," its participants were to be detached from the 3rd and the 4th Bomb Squadron, which had some night-flying experience from the period that it was operating out of Kweilin before that base was evacuated.
On October 30, two 3rd Squadron B-25s (both J models) formed up with two from the 4th Squadron (an H and a J) and proceeded from Peishiyi to Chihkiang (Zhijiang) (27⁰21'01"N, 109⁰35'24"E), about 150 miles north of Kweilin. Capts. George C. Cunningham and Reuben Ragland, 1Lt. Leo C. Baker, 2Lts. Thomas H. Edgerton and Wayne H. Senecal, SSgt. James E. McCann, Sgt. John W. England, and Cpls. Andrew R. Allegretto, Herman L. Burton, and Lloyd E. Jackson were the first Americans to be assigned from the 3rd Squadron. Of the Chinese taking part, 1Lts. Ouyang Chun (X-277) and Sheng Chiu-jang (X-225), Sub-Lt. Chang Kuang-lu (X-819), and Sgts. Liu Teng-wen (X-2131), Ho Wei-ching (X-1395), Wang Ching-chuan (X-1400), Wang Tsung-cheng (X-2294), Teng Chiu-sheng (X-2133), Tso Jui-chen (X-1414), Taun Ysai-pang (X-1401), and Su Chai-yu (X-2305) were sent to join their American counterparts.
Col. Dunning and Col. Frank E. Rouse (who had been with the fighter group since training began at Malir but was awaiting orders back to the States) were eager to begin operations immediately. They proposed a mission that very night, but discretion prevailed, and they delayed night operations for a few days to allow the bomber crews to become familiar with the airfield and the surrounding terrain. Members of Task Force 34 spent their first week getting organized. As ranking officer, the 4th Squadron’s Capt. Moncure N. ("Monty") Lyon was placed in command, and Capt. Ragland was assigned as operations officer. For the 3rd and 4th Squadrons, only the detachments operating out of Chihkiang were capable of joining in the action through the following month because of ongoing rain and shortages at Peishiyi.
In June, Capt. Sam Carran of the 26th Fighter Squadron, 5th Fighter Group, had described Chihkiang Field as “a picturesque spot.” Situated at the western base of the Paima Shan Mountains, “it lies in a small, fertile valley formed by the Hung Kieng River as it flows about the feet of the surrounding mountains,” he wrote. “Heavy rainfall keeps the valley green. . . . Colors are vivid and contrasting, sudden strange fogs and brilliant sunsets are frequent. The rugged, off-shaped peaks, with clouds floating through them, form an eerie backdrop for a ‘Land of Oz’-like scene.” He wrote that the mountains presented "a formidable obstacle, with the consequence that many and varied weather as well as navigational difficulties daily confront our airmen.” The narrow taxi strip was "carved off the top of a hill,” with the revetments in which the planes were stored at night "down in a kind of rice paddy area away from the main part of the runway.”
The airfield's runway consisted of about 3,200 feet of gravel with a short dirt overrun on the north end. The south end sloped down at about a thirty-degree angle and ended abruptly with a precipitous drop of about a hundred feet down to mud flats that extended for several hundred yards to the river. The following January, this hazardous configuration led the pilot of a 341st Bomb Group B-25J to miscalculate and overshoot about two-thirds of the runway, causing the bomber to drop off the end and crash into the rice paddy below. As the plane burned, the flight engineer's leg was trapped under the heavy armor plate, and flames began to reach him. After repeated desperate attempts to pull him out, Col. Dunning mercifully shot the doomed man in the head.
About a mile away from the revetments were the living quarters, with the Chinese in one area, American enlisted men in another area, and officers in yet another. The quarters were initially wooden barracks, although winterized tents were added later. According to Jim Bennie, a 17th Fighter Squadron P-40 crew chief also stationed there, the barracks had potbelly stoves that were put into use when the weather turned cold, as well as electric lights and bunk beds. "The beds were two by fours with cords slatted between them and net mattresses, just a cotton pad. You had your two blankets and a mosquito net, which was obviously used to keep out mosquitoes but also to keep out rats. Rats were always a problem.” In addition, there was an orderly room and a medic's clinic. The mess hall was arranged with the kitchen in the middle and dining rooms on one side for enlisted men and officers on the other. The food provided was “caribou” and the invariable water buffalo, rice, and bean sprouts, with eggs for breakfast.
Task Force 34's first combat mission took off from Chihkiang at 0720 on November 9. Capt. Lyon, with a 4th Squadron crew, was in the lead of three Mitchells, each carrying twenty-two 100-lb. demolition bombs fused instantaneous at the nose. No serial numbers, “Chinese numbers,” or model numbers for the aircraft were provided in mission reports, although they included the two 3rd Squadron B-25Js, according to the squadron’s historical report. They can be identified as serial #43-27809, A/C #714, and #43-3939, A/C #722. Capt. Ragland flew one of the wing planes with 2Lt. Senecal as his copilot, Capt. Cunningham as bombardier, 2Lt. Young C. H. as navigator, and SSgt. McCann and Sgts. Tso J. C. and Taun Y. P. as gunners (all 3rd squadron except Young). Lt. Baker was pilot of the third Mitchell, with Capt. Shen C. J. as copilot, 2Lt. Edgerton as navigator, Cpl. Allegretto as turret gunner, Ho W. C. as waist gunner, and Wang C. L. as tail gunner (all 3rd Squadron). Operational intelligence reports for Task Force 34 during its brief period of operations provide evidence that most missions involved crews that were “mixed” to include not only both nationalities but also members of both squadrons, although some missions were made up of single-nationality and/or single-squadron crews. Missions were credited to the squadron represented by the pilot of the lead plane.
The objective of this mission was to bomb storage areas near Yiyang (Jieyang), northwest of Shatow (Shantou) in Kwangtung Province. Twelve 5th Fighter Group P-40s flew escort. Lyon’s navigator had difficulty in locating the exact target since it was on a dike beside a stream, and the area was flooded and covered with a network of dikes, streams, and canals. Incendiary bombs dropped to mark the target failed to explode, and there was no other satisfactory check point. The Mitchells came in on a south-to-north bomb run at 6,000 feet indicated at 190 mph ground speed and intervalometer set at 150. As the lead bombardier was attempting to pick up the target, he accidentally tripped the release mechanism (set to drop in train), and the others dropped on his lead. Sixty-one of the bombs fell short, inflicting only minor damage to a village south of the target. Five bombs that hung up in the racks and failed to release were jettisoned. The planes were back down at 0930. McCann later explained that in addition to being extremely dangerous, returning with bombs that could not be dropped on target meant that the mission had not been completed and the aircrew was not given credit for it.
A second mission, the 4th Squadron’s 1Lt. Charles J. Portaluppi flying the lead plane, Capt. Lyon as his copilot, and 2Lt. Edgerton (who listed this as his fourth combat mission) as navigator, was off at 1137 on the ninth. The formation, flying without escort, again included the two 3rd Squadron Mitchells. Lt. Baker was pilot of the first wing plane, with Sub-Lt. Chang K. L. as copilot, 2Lt. S. A. Lipira as navigator (the crew’s only 4th squadron member), and Cpl. Allegretto, Ho W. C., and Wang C. C. as gunners, while Lt. Senecal flew in second wing position, with Capt. Ragland as his copilot, Capt. Cunningham as bombardier, 2Lt. Young C. H. (4th squadron) as navigator, and SSgt. McCann and Sgts. Tso J. C. and Taun Y. P. as gunners. Each plane carried twenty-two 100-lb. demolition bombs. The objective of the mission was again to hit the storage area near Shatow, which was located this time without undue difficulty. Because of "the extreme narrowness" of the target, the bombers made two passes, both from north to south. The first was a practice run. Bombs were dropped on Edgerton’s lead on the second run. The gyroscope of his bombsight failed, resulting in an error in deflection of 200 yards to the right. Most of the bombs fell east of the storage facilities, and the only damage was to a house at the extreme edge of the target area reported as destroyed. Crewmen observed meager and inaccurate automatic weapons fire over the target. The return flight was without incident except that one plane experienced minor engine trouble caused by defective spark plugs. All were down at 1405.
Maj. Don Hummel, Chinese-American Composite Wing intelligence officer and historical officer, wrote that the "relative flop" of these early missions was because the crews were "out of practice, over-anxious, and tense" after two months of enforced idleness. Lt. Portaluppi added details:
As soon as the weather broke, the Fighters were more than eager to have Bomber Task Force 34 . . . do some bombing for them. Coming in the wake of almost two months dreary inactivity, this was welcome news to us. However, much to our dismay, the first two missions proved to be slight duds due to a combination of factors: smallness of the target, tenseness on the part of inexperienced navigator-bombardiers, and bomb-sight malfunctions. On both occasions we missed the target and felt rather bad about it. We were afraid that our stock would be lowered in the estimation of our confreres in peashooters, and we became even a trifle over anxious to prove ourselves.
On a third mission that included 3rd Squadron personnel on that date, Lt. Baker took off aboard a B-25J at 2025 with seventeen fragmentation bomb clusters to alert and harass motor vehicle traffic in the Hsiang Valley. His copilot was Sub-Lt. Chang H. L., with Capt. Cunningham as navigator-bombardier, Cpl. Jackson as turret gunner, Sgt. England as waist gunner, and Sgt. Ho W. C. as tail gunner (all 3rd Squadron crewmen). The general purpose of this mission was to test the feasibility of night operations without moonlight. On the outbound flight, the bomber let down from 10,000 to 2,500 feet after reaching Siangtan (Xiangtan) and turned north.
Crewmen sighted the lights of a convoy of from twenty to thirty vehicles near Lukow. By the time the plane could make a 180-degree turn and come back, nearly all lights had been extinguished. Cunningham dropped six clusters, setting ablaze at least one truck and probably destroying or damaging several others. Baker continued north, bypassed Changsha to the east, and proceeded to Siangyin. There he turned south on the west bank of the Hsiang to Siangtang and then turned north again over the same route. Northeast of Changsha, crewmen spotted the lights of a convoy of about ten vehicles. The pilot dropped four frag clusters on a south-to-north run at 2,500 feet parallel and very close to the convoy, probably inflicting heavy damage. Baker again turned south on the west bank of the river “because time was running short,” encountering intense fire from a variety of small arms and automatic weapons north of Yoloshan, so he turned to drop the seven remaining clusters on a run toward the south. Fire was silenced. Anti-aircraft and ground fire of varying degrees of intensity came up from many points along the river, but the plane was down safely at 0010.
Portaluppi praised Lt. Baker for this and later night missions. “Subsequent night operations proved successful and although both Capt. Lyon and Lt. Portaluppi had achieved some highly gratifying results on several operations, it was to Lt. Baker of the Third Squadron that most credit was due. He continued to amaze us by his unusual night vision and by his propensity to dropping frags right on top of trucks in a convoy thus starting many a fire.”
An auto mechanic in Indianapolis before enlisting in the Air Corps in late 1940, Baker was trained as an aviation mechanic and served in the Panama Canal Zone for twenty-two months. Following training as an aviation cadet, he received his commission and wings in late August 1943 and arrived in the CBI later that year. Originally attached to the 22nd Bomb Squadron, 341st Bomb Group, one of his early combat missions was as pilot of a B-25H on April 15, 1944, to hit a railroad bridge fifteen to twenty miles northeast of Hanoi. His bombardier-navigator, James M. White, later described him as “probably the best 75 mm gunner in the Air Corps.” Despite “abominable” weather—rain, sleet, hail, and heavy turbulence—Baker spotted the river through a hole in the clouds and started a tight, spiraling descent. “The pucker factor was high as we knew the valley through which the river flowed to be no more than two to three miles wide with mountains rising on both sides,” White wrote. “From time to time the clouds completely obscured our vision. It was cold in the cockpit but, looking over at Lee, I could see beads of sweat running off his nose. As for me, I could feel a steady stream running the length of my spine.” Despite heavy ground fire and “tracers whistling past us,” Baker took out a “rapid-firing, multi-cannon type antiaircraft installation” and a machine gun emplacement with the cannon and then destroyed one span of the bridge and seriously damaged the other with 1,000-lb. high-explosive bombs on two passes. “Needless to say, the brass of the 22nd Bomb Squadron were highly skeptical when told of our results,” White wrote. It was only after confirming photographs were submitted that they received credit for the destruction.
Many years later, Baker described these early missions undertaken by young, inexperienced aircrews: “A bunch of kids in a hot rod is what it was.” He remembered a bailout soon afterward, when it took thirty days for the crew to walk back to their base. A boy no older than thirteen led them around Japanese emplacements and back to American lines, he said. “The boy would only accept a fountain pen for his service,” Baker recalled in a newspaper interview conducted in the mid-1970s. He admitted to being terrified, although he spoke casually about bailing out and moving behind enemy lines.
Baker’s November 9 raid was the first of many "moonless night missions,” initially suggested by Col. Dunning, to be undertaken by Task Force 34. Col. Dunning concluded that these were not only practical but profitable, despite the added risks. As a result, many of the succeeding missions were night single-plane strikes at river, rail, and road traffic in the Hsiang Valley and from Hankow to Kweilin. Although night missions had been accomplished prior to this, none had been attempted without moonlight. On these missions, total darkness and extremely-limited radio homing facilities made it imperative that the navigator never lose track of the plane's position. Moonless-night missions proved so successful that they became a specialty of Task Force 34. An often-lamented disadvantage was that crews were seldom able to determine the extent of damage caused by the raids because they consistently encountered severely-limited visibility.
On any mission, the navigator was considered the most critical member of the crew because it was his responsibility to find the target and then guide the plane back to home base. Even under the best conditions, he had to overcome difficulties created by charts that were often inaccurate and lacked detail, no radio homers except around a few bases (and these were often distorted by the mountains), no radar or other navigational aids, and incorrect weather forecasts (especially upper winds). These limitations were multiplied on night missions without moonlight, when the navigator must rely even more heavily on instruments. So dangerous was this kind of flying that a 4th Squadron B-25 later crashed into a hillside only minutes after takeoff from Chihkiang. Detachment navigator 2Lt. Salvatore A. Lipira, who participated in TF34’s second mission with Lt. Baker and many others thereafter, was one of a six-member crew who lost their lives only six months after this first moonless night mission.
Task Force 34 racked up an impressive record of victories between its inception and its reorganization in mid-January 1945, completing sixty-three missions.
Learn more about this remarkable outfit and its accomplishments! Find the full story in The Spray and Pray Squadron: 3rd Bomb Squadron, 1st Bomb Group, Chinese-American Composite Wing in World War II.